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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001731

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: UN PREVIEWS GON REQUEST FOR PEACE PROCESS SUPPORT
REF: USUN 1287

Classified By: DCM Nick Dean, Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

¶1. (C) UN Resident Representative Matthew Kahane previewed the eagerly anticipated GON request for support to the United Nations in a briefing for selected countries June 30. Kahane insisted that he could not predict when the UN might receive the letter from the GON, ascribing the delay to dynamics among the GON and political parties. He expects the UN also to be asked to provide election monitoring support. The UN Res Rep recognized the need for urgency to maintain momentum in Nepal's peace process and address the critical need to disarm the Maoists. However, he made clear that he expected a UN response to follow usual procedures, entailing weeks or even months to deploy.

Five Areas of Assistance

¶2. (C) Kahane said that the GON letter would request UN assistance in five areas:
-- continued human rights monitoring,
-- assistance to the national monitoring committee in general terms with specifics to be determined,
-- reassurance to the Nepalese public that the Maoists will not have access to arms,
-- supervision/cantonment of the Peoples Liberation Army,
-- assurance that the Nepalese Army will remain under control.

UN Election Monitoring

¶3. (C) The UN Resident Representative said that the letter would present these specific requests as elements of UN support the GON believes would be conducive to free and fair elections. The GON will also request UN monitoring assistance for constituent assembly elections.

Letter Slow to Dispatch

¶4. (C) Kahane said that recent discussion with DPM and Foreign Minister Oli had made clear that the much-anticipated letter would require further vetting within the government

and among the parties. He opined that GON-Seven Party Alliance dynamics were a principal reason for delay.

UN Processes

15. (C) The UN Res Rep outlined the standard UN procedures a GON request for assistance would trigger, culminating in dispatch of a UN assessment mission. He noted that in terms of UN agencies that would participate, UN resolutions 1612 (Children in Conflict) and 1325 (Women in Peace Processes) would play a prominent role. Beyond the central role of the UN Department for Peace Keeping, he expected UN agencies associated with post-conflict DDR to figure prominently.

Maintaining Momentum on the Peace Process

16. (C) Kahane recognized concern among Nepal's political parties that the UN must maintain momentum and not allow the peace process in Nepal to founder as a result of the UN's slow-moving bureaucracy. Kahane observed that the UN faces many demands for peacekeeping assistance. UN member country support for a Nepal mission is critical, especially proactive engagement from countries with special interest in Nepal.

Maoist Support for PKO?

17. (C) Regarding whether the expected letter of request would be a joint GON/Maoist letter, the UN official was equivocal. The UN would in any case have to be confident that all parties to the conflict requested the assistance, a circumstance to be confirmed as part of the assessment mission. In any event, he expected that a letter referencing the various plans and codes of conduct agreed between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists would reflect Maoist support for the request.

Don't Rush the UN

18. (C) Kahane was evasive when repeatedly pressed on how quickly the UN could respond to a GON request for assistance. He recognized that extensive UN preparations for engagement would not provide the surety required should the Maoists join the government within a matter of weeks. The UN Res Rep noted the relative speed with which the UN had deployed in East Timor, which he said had been done in just weeks. He observed, however, that the scale of the mission in Timor -- with just one million citizens and 600 rebel soldiers -- is much smaller than the large mission required for Nepal.

Obstacles to PKO

19. (C) The UN official expounded at length on obstacles facing a peacekeeping mission in Nepal. These range, he said, from establishing a single cease fire (rather than the current parallel GON/Maoist cease fires), technical cantonment and weapons safeguarding preparation, to UN HQ planning, member support and financing. Pressed again on the need for dispatch to send a signal of hope to the Nepalese, Kahane added the need for trained military observers to the list. The UN official noted the Maoist vision of peacekeeping, expressed by recent Maoist interlocutors, who hoped for a "Peace Corps-like" PKO operation.

Comment

110. (C) The UN Res Rep's briefing outlined what the UN expects from the GON, but equally importantly, a disturbing lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the UN, at least at the Nepal mission level. Kahane was unresponsive to repeated prodding by interlocutors on the need for an expedited response from the UN to the much-anticipated GON request for support. Clearly, focused anticipation of the GON request

and energetic engagement of the UN by interested member countries, especially the U.S., will be required to accelerate expanded UN engagement in Nepal.

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